Anti-Defection Merger Defence: How Merger Became a Tool to Join Rival Parties

📌 Summary:

• Paragraph 4 of the 10th Schedule (Anti-Defection Law) allows members to merge with another party without disqualification if two-thirds of the legislative party joins
• Originally intended to protect genuine ideological mergers (e.g., two parties coming together programmatically)
• In practice, Paragraph 4 has been invoked to enable mass defection under the guise of "merger" — most recently by AAP MPs joining BJP
• The article traces historical misuse: TDP merger with BJP (2014 Rajya Sabha), Shiv Sena and NCP internal splits (2022-23)
• Key distinction: the 10th Schedule applies to the "legislative party" (MPs/MLAs) — a merger at the parliamentary level does NOT require the original political party to actually merge
• Supreme Court's Nabam Rebia (2016) ruling: Speaker/Chairman cannot decide disqualification while a motion to remove them is pending
• Kihoto Hollohan (1992) judgment: anti-defection decisions are subject to judicial review (not immune)
• Reform proposals: abolish Paragraph 4 altogether; require actual party merger (not just legislative wing); empower independent tribunal instead of presiding officer
• The article argues the merger provision has become a constitutional fig leaf for opportunistic party-switching, defeating the law's purpose