Rajya Sabha defections, constitutional questions [Op-Ed]

📌 Summary:

• Context: On April 24, 2026, seven of AAP''s 10 sitting Rajya Sabha MPs publicly announced merger with BJP — claiming over two-thirds of party MPs had decided to merge, invoking 10th Schedule of the Constitution

• Core argument: The merger raises significant constitutional questions about the scope of the "merger" exception under Paragraph 4 of the 10th Schedule; this is unprecedented at the national level (earlier seen at State level, e.g., Eknath Shinde faction in Maharashtra)

• Constitutional framework: (1) Original Constitution (1950) — Article 103 provided limited grounds for MP disqualification, decided by President on opinion of ECI (2) 52nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1985 — introduced 10th Schedule to address defections; disqualification decided by Speaker/Chairman (3) Original 10th Schedule had TWO exceptions — "split" (Paragraph 3, allowed if 1/3rd of legislators formed faction) and "merger" (Paragraph 4) (4) 91st Constitution Amendment Act, 2003 — DELETED Paragraph 3 (the "split" exception), following Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) recommendations and 170th Law Commission Report (1999)

• Implication of split deletion: Parliament signalled clear intent to restore primacy of the "political party" as central unit of democratic accountability, over the "legislature party"

• Supreme Court precedent: Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023) — Constitution Bench held that the 10th Schedule should NOT be interpreted in a way that severs the "umbilical cord" between legislature party and political party

• Key legal question (causal chain): Can a "merger" under Para 4 be effected SOLELY by 2/3rd of legislature party? Or must it be preceded by/reflect a decision of the ORIGINAL POLITICAL PARTY itself?

  • Plain reading of Para 4: exemption applies where the "original political party" merges with another political party
  • Therefore Para 4(2) (which introduces a deeming fiction based on 2/3 legislators'' consent) cannot be read in isolation to displace primacy of the political organisation
  • Allowing pure legislator-driven merger would "invert the constitutional design" — letting legislature party dictate fate of the political party

• Solution implied: Speaker must apply a substantive test (whether the parent political party itself has merged) and not merely a numerical/legislative-party test

🎯 UPSC Relevance: GS2 (Polity — Anti-Defection Law, 10th Schedule, 52nd & 91st Amendments, Speaker''s role, judicial interpretation; functioning of Parliament; constitutional morality)

📝 Prelims Facts:

• 10th Schedule introduced by 52nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1985
• "Split" exception (Para 3) DELETED by 91st Constitution Amendment Act, 2003
• "Merger" exception remains under Para 4 — requires 2/3 of legislature party
• Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms — May 1990
• 170th Law Commission Report — 1999 (recommended deletion of Para 3)
• Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023) — Constitution Bench on Shiv Sena split
• AAP Rajya Sabha episode: April 24, 2026 — 7 of 10 MPs

🔑 Key Term: 10th Schedule "Merger" Exception (Para 4) — Provides immunity from disqualification if the original political party merges with another and at least 2/3 of legislature party members agree to the merger. Originally intended as a safeguard for democratic realignment; increasingly used as a workaround for individual defections.